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Until relatively recently, it was an article of faith among scholars of the 
common law that their law was almost entirely untouched by the Roman law 
which was recognised to be the basis of the civil laws on the continent. The 
reason was partly romantic nationalism, but with a political slant; the common 
law was viewed as the safeguard of individual liberty against any undue 
interference by the state, whereas the civil law, tainted by such maxims as 
'what pleases the prince has the force of law,' was envisaged as the justifica-
tion oftyranny. 
There is, however, another less obvious reason for this underestimation of 
the influence ofRoman law. When the history of the common law came to be 
studied seriously in the later part of the nineteenth century, its scholars were 
much influenced by the Germanistik wing of the German historical school. 
Roman law was sometimes seen by Germanists as a kind of disease, infecting 
the purity of Germanic law. From this perspective the common law was a 
Germanic customary law which had somehow managed to retain its purity and 
resist infection by Roman law at a time when the whole of continental Europe, 
and even Scotland, were succumbing to the plague. The great historian of 
German law, Heinrich Brunner, when investigating the reasons for the 
survival of the common law, observed that when it was given its first system-
atic statement in the thirteenth century treatise by Bracton, it received an 
'inoculation' of Roman law conceptions, which was sufficient to immunise 
it from a full-scale infection in the sixteenth century. 
Today when the common law is losing some of its characteristic features 
and moving nearer to the civil law, we can look at the influence ofRoman law 
more calmly. In the first place we may note its influence on English legal 
theory. The strength of the common law has always been in its handling of 
cases, in finding pragmatic solutions to legal problems; its weakness has been 
in the theory of law. In particular it has had to face the problem that it is 'a 
wilderness of single instances' and to find a way of organising the fruits of a 
series of decisions in a systematic way. 
As already noted, already in the thirteenth century Bracton borrowed and 
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adapted from Roman law (in fact from Azo) to impose on the embryonic 
common law a system based on Roman categories. Bracton did not apply 
these Roman notions slavishly, but he wrote in Latin and when a writer uses 
a language with technical terms, which already have an established meaning 
in that language, some of that meaning is bound to be transferred to what the 
writer is describing. The English ownership that Bracton dealt with may have 
differed greatly from the Roman ownership but, by discussing it in terms of 
dominium and proprietas, Bracton painted it in Roman colours. As the 
greatest English legal historian, F.W. Maitland put it, from their knowledge 
of Roman law, Bracton and his contemporaries 'learned how to write about, 
how to think about, law and besides this they acquired some fertile ideas, 
distinctions and maxims which they made their own.' 1 
From the time of Bracton onwards, common lawyers have turned for 
guidance in questions of legal theory to the contemporary version of Roman 
law on the continent. In the seventeenth century, Chief Justice Hale was 
inspired by humanist models to suggest an Analysis of the Common Law, 
based on the Institutional system, which was used in the following century by 
Blackstone as the framework of his famous Commentaries. This work formed 
the foundation of the modern common law, particularly in the early United 
States, where legal libraries were rare. 
In the nineteenth century John Austin presented the concepts of the 
German Pandectists as if they were universal notions applicable as much to 
the common law as to Roman law. As legal education in the common law 
became established in the second half of the nineteenth century, its various 
components, such as contracts and torts (the common law does not recognise 
the concept of obligation) were increasingly presented in systems organised 
around principles, derived ultimately from Roman law. They were viewed not 
so much as Roman principles as principles of universal validity. 
In its detailed rules, in the subtlety of its arguments, the common law has 
been self-sufficient; but when it was necessary to take a larger view, it was 
lacking. In particular English lawyers have often been attracted by maxims 
derived from Roman law, which they have understood as general principles, 
applicable to all law. These maxims, because they are axiomatic, are taken for 
granted and do not need to be proved. Some are legal proverbs, perhaps 
adapted to refer them to the common law rather than the civil law. Sir Edward 
Coke, who in the early seventeenth century transmitted the substance of the 
medieval common law to modern times in his Institutes and Commentary on 
Littelton, was very prone to cite Latin maxims, some of which he invented 
himself or quietly adapted for his purposes. Thus he referred to the maxim 
multa in iure communi contra rationem disputandi pro communi utilitate 
introducta sunt (Co. Lit. 70b ). This is taken word for word from the remark 
of the Roman jurist Julian in D.9.2.51.2, but Coke says 'iure communi 'where 
Julian said 'iure civili '! 
The common law applied by the common law courts was not by any means 
l. Select Passages from Bracton and Azo, Selden Soc. v.8 (London, 1894), xxiv. 
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the whole of the law ofEngland. Its limitations meant that it had to be supple-
mented by two other jurisdictions, that of the civil law courts and that of the 
Court of Chancery, both of which were directly influenced by Roman law. 
The civil law courts were the descendants of the church courts which 
applied canon law before the Reformation and of the Court of Admiralty. 
After the Reformation the church courts continued as the courts of the Church 
of England, with exclusive jurisdiction over questions of marriage and status 
and over testamentary dispositions of moveable property. They continued to 
apply the same law as they had always done and followed the leading conti-
nental authorities. So did the Court of Admiralty, which was concerned 
largely with maritime law. The teaching of canon law was formally abolished 
in England in 1535, but the teaching of Roman law continued in the two 
ancient English universities of Oxford and Cambridge (until the nineteenth 
century they were the only English universities). Indeed these universities did 
not introduce any teaching of the English common law until the end of the 
eighteenth century. Common lawyers had no rights of audience in the civil 
law courts, which were reserved for members of Doctors' Commons, i.e., 
those who had doctorates in civil law from Oxford or Cambridge. Together 
with proctors and notaries, they formed a small profession of civil law 
specialists, which continued until the middle of the nineteenth century, when 
the jurisdiction, but not the law and procedure, was merged with that of the 
common law courts. 
The civil law courts did not use common law procedure with its lay juries; 
they followed the Romano-canonical procedure with wholly professional 
judges and an emphasis on written documents rather than the oral evidence 
which juries required. Most of these characteristic civil law features were 
preserved even after the merger and are visible today, particularly in Admiral-
ty cases. 
The other route through which Roman law influence has been mediated 
into English law is through the Court of Chancery, which administered not the 
common law but Equity. By the later middle ages the common law had 
become a rigid system, which failed to provide all the remedies that the king's 
subjects needed. So they had recourse to petitions to the king, as the fountain 
of justice, to grant them the remedies which justice demanded, outside the 
jurisdiction of the common law courts. Some of these limitations of the 
common law were due to its exclusive use of the jury procedure. A lay court, 
such as the Roman iudex under the formulary procedure and the common law 
jury, which comes into being solely to deal with a particular case and has no 
continuing existence, is effectively limited to one kind of remedy, namely the 
award of money damages. Any other remedy, such as order to do something 
or not to do something, is beyond its powers, if only because the court will no 
longer be in existence when the time comes to decide whether the order has 
been carried out or not. Furthermore certain types of remedy, which lay down 
standards of conduct to be adopted by certain groups, such as guardians, have 
to be administered in a consistent way in all cases and can only be granted by 
professional judges. 
167 
I n  s u c h  c a s e s  t h e  k i n g  r e f e r r e d  t h e  p e t i t i o n s  t o  h i s  C o u n c i l .  T h e  p r e s i d e n t  
o f  t h e  C o u n c i l  w a s  t h e  C h a n c e l l o r ,  w h o  u n t i l  t h e  R e f o r m a t i o n  w a s  u s u a l l y  a n  
e c c l e s i a s t i c ,  f a m i l i a r  w i t h  c a n o n  a n d  c i v i l  l a w .  G r a d u a l l y  t h e  C h a n c e l l o r ' s  
c o u r t ,  t h e  C h a n c e r y ,  b e c a m e  a  s e p a r a t e  j u r i s d i c t i o n  p a r a l l e l  w i t h  t h a t  o f  t h e  
c o m m o n  l a w .  I t  h a d  a  w h o l l y  p r o f e s s i o n a l  p r o c e d u r e ,  i n f l u e n c e d  b y  t h e  
R o m a n o - c a n o n i c a l  p r o c e d u r e .  S i n c e  t h e  C h a n c e l l o r  a c t e d  i n  p e r s o n a m  a n d  
c o u l d  i m p r i s o n  t h o s e  w h o  d i s o b e y e d  h i s  o r d e r s  f o r  t h e i r  ' c o n t e m p t  o f  c o u r t , '  
h i s  c o u r t  c o u l d  i s s u e  o r d e r s  a n d  i n j u n c t i o n s .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  i f  a  c o m p l a i n a n t  
a l l e g e d  t h a t  h i s  o p p o n e n t  h a d  o b t a i n e d  a  j u d g m e n t  a g a i n s t  h i m  i n  t h e  c o m m o n  
l a w  c o u r t  w h i c h  w a s  u n j u s t ,  t h e  C h a n c e l l o r  w o u l d  i n v e s t i g a t e  t h e  t r u t h  o f  t h e  
a l l e g a t i o n .  T h e n ,  i f  s a t i s f i e d  t h a t  i t  w a s  t r u e ,  h e  w o u l d  i s s u e  a  ' c o m m o n  
i n j u n c t i o n '  a g a i n s t  t h e  o t h e r  p a r t y  n o t  t o  e n f o r c e  t h e  j u d g m e n t  i n  h i s  f a v o u r ,  
e v e n  t h o u g h  i t  w a s  f o r m a l l y  v a l i d ,  o n  p a i n  o f  i m p r i s o n m e n t  i f  t h e  i n j u n c t i o n  
w a s  d i s o b e y e d .  I t  h a s  b e e n  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t h i s  p r o c e d u r e  w a s  b a s e d  o n  t h e  
m o d e l  o f  t h e  d e n u n c i a t i o  e v a n g e l i c a  o f  c a n o n  l a w .  
C h a n c e r y  b e g a n  a s  a  c o u r t  o f  c o n s c i e n c e  b u t  t h e  C h a n c e l l o r s  t r i e d  t o  a c t  
a c c o r d i n g  t o  g e n e r a l  p r i n c i p l e s  a n d  t h e  c i v i l  l a w  o f f e r e d  p l e n t y  o f  a p p o s i t e  
p r i n c i p l e s .  T h u s  w h e n  t h e y  g r a n t e d  r e l i e f  i n  c a s e s  o f  e r r o r ,  f r a u d  o r  f o r g e r y ,  
o r  w h e n  t h e y  g a v e  s p e c i a l  p r o t e c t i o n  t o  i n f a n t s  o r  i n s a n e  p e r s o n s ,  t h e y  c o u l d  
f i n d  p r e c e d e n t s  i n  t h e  w a y  t h e  s t r i c t  c i v i l  l a w  i n  R o m e  h a d  b e e n  m o d i f i e d  
a c c o r d i n g  t o  e q u i t a b l e  p r i n c i p l e s ,  b o t h  b y  t h e  p r a e t o r s  a n d  b y  t h e  E m p e r o r s .  
T h e  m a i n  i n s t i t u t i o n  p r o d u c e d  b y  E q u i t y  i s  t h e  t r u s t ,  u n d e r  w h i c h  p r o p e r t y  i s  
o w n e d  b y  A  o n  b e h a l f  o f B .  A ,  t h e  t r u s t e e ,  h a s  t h e  o w n e r s h i p  a t  l a w  a n d  B ,  t h e  
b e n e f i c i a r y ,  h a s  t h e  o w n e r s h i p  i n  e q u i t y .  T h e  d u t i e s  o f  t r u s t e e s  w e r e  w o r k e d  
o u t  b y  t h e  C h a n c e l l o r s  o n  a  c a s e  b y  c a s e  b a s i s ,  b u t  i t  s e e m s  m o r e  t h a n  l i k e l y  
t h a t  R o m a n  l a w  a n a l o g u e s ,  s u c h  a s  t h e  d u t i e s  o f  t u t o r s  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e i r  
w a r d ' s  p r o p e r t y ,  w e r e  h e l p f u l  t o  t h e m  i n  t h i s  r e g a r d .  O n c e  a g a i n  t h e  l a t e  
n i n e t e e n t h  c e n t u r y  f u s i o n  o f  e q u i t y  w i t h  t h e  c o m m o n  l a w  h a s  n o t  a f f e c t e d  
t h e s e  d o c t r i n e s .  
E v e n  i n  t h e  c o m m o n  l a w  i n  t h e  s t r i c t  s e n s e ,  R o m a n  i n f l u e n c e s  c a n  b e  
r e c o g n i s e d  i n  c e r t a i n  p a r t s  o f  t h e  l a w  w h i c h  w e r e  d e v e l o p e d  a f t e r  t h e  M i d d l e  
A g e s .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  E n g l i s h  l a n d  l a w ,  w h i c h  i s  b a s e d  o n  f e u d a l  i d e a s ,  s e e m s  
a t  f i r s t  s i g h t  m o s t  u n r o m a n .  H o w e v e r  t h e  l a w  o f  e a s e m e n t s ,  r i g h t s  i n  r e m  
e x e r c i s a b l e  o v e r  o n e  p i e c e  o f  l a n d  i n  f a v o u r  o f  a n o t h e r  p i e c e  o f  l a n d ,  w a s  
d e v e l o p e d  l a t e r  t h a n  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  l a n d  l a w  a n d  i s  a l m o s t  e n t i r e l y  t a k e n  o v e r  
f r o m  t h e  R o m a n  l a w  o f  p r a e d i a l  s e r v i t u d e s .  I t  w a s  f o u n d  c o n v e n i e n t  t o  
p r e t e n d  t h a t  o n  t h i s  m a t t e r  a n c i e n t  R o m a n  l a w  a n d  t r a d i t i o n a l  E n g l i s h  c u s t o m s  
w e r e  t h e  s a m e .  
I n  t h e  c o m m o n  l a w  s t a t e s  o f  t h e  s o u t h e r n  U . S . A .  ( L o u i s i a n a  w a s ,  a n d  i s ,  
t h e  e x c e p t i o n  i n  t h a t  i t  h a s  h a d  t h e  c i v i l  l a w ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  t h e  c o m m o n  l a w ,  e v e r  
s i n c e  i t s  a d m i s s i o n  t o  t h e  U n i o n )  b e f o r e  t h e  C i v i l  W a r ,  c a s e s  a r o s e  i n v o l v i n g  
s l a v e s .  E n g l i s h  c o m m o n  l a w  o f f e r e d  n o  p r e c e d e n t s  o n  s u c h  m a t t e r s  a s  t h e  
o w n e r ' s  r i g h t s  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  f u g i t i v e  s l a v e s  a n d  t h e y  w e r e  o f t e n  d e c i d e d  
a c c o r d i n g  t o  R o m a n  l a w , j u s t  b e c a u s e  t h e r e  w a s  n o  E n g l i s h  d e c i s i o n  a v a i l a b l e .  
I n  t h e  p e r i o d  i m m e d i a t e l y  a f t e r  I n d e p e n d e n c e ,  t h e  c o m m o n  l a w  c o u r t s  o f  t h e  
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United States tended to view Roman law more favourably than their English 
counterparts just because the Roman law was not of English origin. 
The influence of Roman law on various aspects of Anglo-American law 
in the past is undeniable. What about today? In a 1987 case,2 the owners of 
an oil tanker, on which a cargo of crude oil had been loaded, had mixed it 
with other oil of their own already in the tanker. It was possible to work out 
precisely the amounts of oil originally belonging to the two parties. The 
dispute was as to how the mixed oil should be divided up. The relevant 
contract provided that any dispute should go to arbitration and that English 
law should apply. The issue of how mixed substances should be divided had 
been discussed in a number of cases going back to 1594. A case of that year 
concerned the mixing of two stacks of hay, and it was held that where, as in 
that case, the mixing was due to the wrongful act of one of the parties, the 
whole mass should be assigned to the other, innocent, party. More recent cases 
established that if the wrongdoer had destroyed the evidence by which the 
innocent party could show what he had lost, the wrongdoer must suffer from 
the resulting uncertainty and if necessary hand over the whole mass. But 
where, as in this case, it was known precisely how much had belonged to each 
party, the authorities did not provide a clear rule. 
The arbitrators felt that they were not bound by any common law rule and 
expressed a preference for the Roman rule of confusio, under which the parties 
owned the whole mass in shares proportionate to their contributions. In the 
appeal against this ruling, the judge observed that 'it is not the function of 
civil justice to award the victim more than he has lost, 'and that even though 
the arbitrators found that when the ship-owners mixed the oil, they were 
engaged in wrongdoing, that dit not justify the application of a different rule 
in the civil action. As he said, 'in the days when corn and hay were to be 
found in heaps which could not be measured accurately, when such disputes 
were tried by jury and witnesses might be illiterate or ignorant, a rough and 
ready rule ... may have been the best they could find. But a primitive rule is no 
longer appropriate when modern and sophisticated methods of measurement 
are available.' The judge felt himself free to apply 'the rule which justice 
requires' and proceeded to apply the Roman rule, adding only that if the 
victim had suffered any loss, such as in respect of quality, as a result of the 
mixing he could claim damages therefor. 
The judge could, of course, have referred to modern civil law (e.g., the 
French code civ. 573 and 574), but by referring rather to the rule of Roman 
law, he was recalling an English legal tradition. That is to treat Roman law, 
and in particular those rules of Roman law which are said to be 'dictated by 
natural reason,' as if they expressed general principles of law accepted by all 
civilised peoples.3 
2. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd v. Greenstone Shipping Co. SA (Panama) [1987] 3 All ER, 893 
(Staughton, J.). 
3. For some remarks on the structural similarities and differences between Roman law, 
traditional common law and modern civil law, P.G. Stein, 'Roman Law, Common Law and 
Civil Law,' 66 Tulane Law Review, 1992, 1591-1603. 
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